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This article presents a normative account of citizenship which requires
respect for labour rights, as much as it requires respect for other
human rights. The exclusion of certain categories of workers, such as
domestic workers, from these rights is wrong. This article presents
domestic workers as marginal citizens who are unfairly deprived of
certain labour rights in national legal orders. It also shows that interna-
tional human rights law counteracts the marginal legal status of this
group of workers. By being attached to everyone simply by virtue of
being human, irrespective of nationality, human rights can complement
citizenship rights when both are viewed as normative standards. The
example of domestic work as it has been approached in international
human rights law in recent years, shows that certain rights of workers
are universal. Their enjoyment cannot depend on citizenship as legal
status or on regular residency. The enjoyment of labour rights as
human rights depends, and should only depend, on the status of some-
one as a human being who is also a worker.
Keywords: marginal citizenship; human rights; labour rights; domestic
workers
Introduction
In a recent essay on citizenship and migrant domestic work, Linda Bosniak
argued that ‘in the context of transnational domestic labor […], characteriz-
ing the equality aspirations of employer women as matters of citizenship
can work to obscure the status citizenship deprivations experienced by
many of the female employees’ (Bosniak 2009, p. 147). The statement
illustrates the following tension: participation in the labour market outside
home empowers women to achieve equal citizenship to men. But this
development is coupled by the expansion of the domestic work sector,
which is under-regulated. Domestic workers, who are most of the time
female, are disadvantaged because national law in many jurisdictions
unfairly excludes them from much labour protective legislation. Domestic
workers are also very often migrant, and immigration legislation in many
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national legal orders also disadvantages them. The lack of citizenship status
(as legal status) leads to their exclusion from additional labour rights.
The situation and treatment of domestic workers is incompatible with a
normative conception of citizenship, which requires respect for labour
rights, together with civil, political and other social rights. The neglect of
domestic workers’ labour rights is problematic for citizenship theory with
its emphasis on the protection of rights for community membership.
Domestic workers remain excluded, marginal citizens.
International human rights law, on the other hand, counteracts the mar-
ginal status of groups of workers who lack certain legal rights in several
national jurisdictions. Human rights are universal normative standards.
Human rights law insists on the universal enjoyment of basic rights,
including labour rights. To exemplify this, this paper presents recent devel-
opments in European human rights and international labour law which have
brought the plight of migrant domestic workers to the forefront of
discussions, having recognized that their exclusion from protective laws is
incompatible with universal human rights principles.
If human rights inform the discussions of citizenship by untying rights
from the status of nationality and bringing them closer to the ideal of
universality, they help to bring domestic workers to the light, rather than
keeping them in the margins of citizenship and the shadows of the labour
market. They can complement the understanding of citizenship rights at a
normative level, and ultimately enhance the protection of marginal citizens.
Human rights can help advance an inclusive account of citizenship, which
is suitable in today’s world of increased labour migration.
Citizenship and rights
The notion of citizenship has seen an explosion of interest in recent years
in literature that approaches it from several angles: active citizenship or
citizenship as political participation (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, p. 361),
passive citizenship or citizenship as rights (Ignatieff 1989, p. 63), and for-
mal citizenship or citizenship as legal status (Young 1989, p. 250). Even
though these are separate lines of enquiry, there are links between them, in
the sense that political participation, for instance, and the recognition of
rights, create a feeling of community membership (Bellamy 2010).
Hannah Arendt described citizenship as the ‘right to have rights’,
discussing the problem of statelessness (Arendt 1968, p. 177). The locus
classicus on citizenship and rights, which is the focus of this piece, is the
essay of the British sociologist T. H. Marshall. Marshall explored the
notion as it developed in Britain in his inﬂuential essay ‘Citizenship and
Social Class’ (Marshall 1997, p. 291). He deﬁned citizenship as ‘a status
bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess
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the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the
status is endowed’ (p. 300). Citizenship has three elements: the civil, the
political and the social.
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom
– liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own
property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. […] By the
political element, I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political
power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elec-
tor of the members of such a body. […] By the social element, I mean the
whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to
the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. (p. 294)
The inclusion of a social element as an essential component of citizen-
ship has been particularly inﬂuential. This aspect of Marshall’s theory is
regularly referred to in human rights literature, for instance, that argues
against the separation of civil, political and social rights in distinct catego-
ries in legal documents.1 Social rights, such as the right to housing and the
right to work, are essential elements of citizenship on Marshall’s analysis,
as much as civil and political rights are, like freedom of expression and
privacy. Full citizenship entails civil, political and social rights.
Even though Marshall was a sociologist, and his analysis appeared
historical and descriptive at ﬁrst, theoretical scholarship examined its
normative implications. In the essay ‘Social Citizenship and the Defence of
Welfare Provision’, for instance, Jeremy Waldron asked what a modern
notion of citizenship entails and what it signiﬁes (Waldron 1993, p. 271).
Waldron argued convincingly that Marshall analysed the way in which
welfare provision ought to be viewed.
The suggestion is that we ought to associate welfare with citizenship because
our concept of citizenship will be radically impoverished if we do not.
Citizenship, on this account demands welfare provision; we cannot have an
adequate notion of citizenship without it. (pp. 279–280)
Against this background, contemporary citizenship theory is a norma-
tive theory.2 It explores what it means to be a full citizen in terms of rights
and duties that individuals must have. It requires the protection of all
categories of rights, and is not tied to citizenship as formal legal status.
Marshall’s analysis is pertinent to the discussion of marginal citizenship
because it places rights at the forefront of the discussion. Against this
background, workers’ rights, usually classiﬁed as social rights, cannot but
constitute an essential component of citizenship too. Discussing American
citizenship, Judith Shklar argued that the right to work is one of its central
elements (Shklar 1995, p.1).3 ‘The dignity of work and of personal
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achievement’, said Shklar, ‘and the contempt for aristocratic idleness,
have since colonial times been an important part of American civic self-
identiﬁcation.’ This is true for many countries, particularly in the Western
world. The inclusion of a right to work as a fundamental citizenship right is
particularly important in jurisdictions, like the United States, where it is not
always protected in bills of rights or other human rights documents. It high-
lights the importance of earning in countries where ‘[a]ristocrats and slaves
are anomalies’ (p. 64). Paid work creates a sense of membership to commu-
nity, and the value of citizenship as a normative concept emphasizes that.
Full citizenship requires the protection of all groups of rights. The
notion of marginal citizenship (as opposed to full citizenship) captures
those who are excluded from some of the rights of citizenship; those that
live in a particular community, participate in that community through their
work or otherwise, have certain rights, but are unfairly excluded from some
other rights. More precisely, this article argues that the right to have a job
is a necessary but not sufﬁcient element for citizenship. Labour rights are
also essential for citizenship.
Marginal citizens, then, for the purposes of this contribution, are those
who are workers, but are excluded from protection of their labour rights
through legislation. The marginalization of workers becomes particularly
dramatic when they are migrant, and immigration legislation gives the
employer a special power to exercise arbitrary control over them: a power
to dominate them (Pettit 1999, p. 52). In these instances, we are faced with
a most dramatic form of marginalization, because the worker does not have
a power to change this condition without a very considerable cost (that of
deportation).
In relation to immigration status, it should be noted before moving on
that for citizenship theory, the idea of belonging is central. In the heart of
the role of rights for citizenship lies the belief that only when a person
enjoys the full range of rights can she or he be full member of a commu-
nity. A community is not a synonym to the state, though, and the impor-
tance of belonging is not limited to state nationals. There is important
literature on cosmopolitan citizenship that is based on the view that in a
globalized world there is increased integration between states, so the
boundaries of the communities are not clear (Bosniak 2000, Weinstock
2001, Benhabib 2004). Citizenship theorists are aware of the potential for
exclusion of immigrants that lack citizenship as formal legal status.4
Citizenship theory addresses the problem of the exclusion of foreign nation-
als by showing that even citizenship as formal legal status is not nowadays
necessarily tied to nationality (e.g. Lehning 2001). Looking at the example
of the European Union and the rights of migrant workers, for instance,
Soysal developed the idea of post-national citizenship, in the context of
which ‘what were previously deﬁned as national rights become entitlements
legitimized on the basis of personhood’ (Soysal 1995, p. 3).
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This article focuses on domestic workers as marginal citizens. Even
though the focus is on domestic workers, though, the argument applies
equally to other marginalized workers, such as the self-employed and
casual workers. A deﬁnition of domestic work and further analysis of its
role today is necessary before moving on.
Domestic work
Domestic workers typically work in private homes, performing various
household tasks, such as cleaning, cooking, gardening and caring for
children or elderly people (the latter are also known as ‘care workers’).5
This type of work is gendered, and most of the times done by women
(Anderson 2000). Domestic workers may be live-in or live-out (full-time or
part-time), employees or independent contractors. Domestic work was
delineated as a separate area of work when productive and reproductive
work got separated. During Victorian times this type of work was
performed by ‘menial or domestic servants’ for middle- and high-class
families, and with the decline in domestic servant employment the weekly
cash-in-hand cleaner has become important for professional couples. During
the post-war period a shift occurred from the model of the ideal family
with a single wage-earning male head of household to the ideal family
being comprised of dual-wage earners. This new model of family life
required accommodations of new patterns of work and family-life, which
resulted, among other things, in an increasing need for domestic labour.
The positive effect of paid domestic work for contemporary society
cannot be underestimated. With changes happening in the labour market,
including the growth of the service economy, higher participation of
women in the market, the sharing of household tasks by men and global-
ization, it has become clear that having domestic workers is beneﬁcial for
family members, employers and the market as a whole. In today’s
economic setting, domestic work is vital for the sustainability and function
of the economy outside the household. Domestic labour can also be a desir-
able job for workers who are not highly skilled and might not easily be
employable in other occupations. Domestic workers are not always low
skilled, though; they are sometimes educated, and migrate to work in the
domestic labour sector in order to send income back to their home
countries (Lutz 2007, p. 189). Like other jobs, domestic work can be
fulﬁlling: the worker develops a personal relationship of trust with the
employer, sometimes to a degree higher than other jobs, and may feel
highly valued for the services provided.
Yet the particularities of domestic work set challenges too. The intimacy
that often characterizes the relationship between the employer and the
domestic worker makes her seem like a family member – not a worker.
This sense of intimacy can be false, though, because the relationship
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between the domestic worker and the employer, who is a woman most of
the times, is characterized by a difference of status that the latter is often
keen to maintain (Anderson 2007).
Domestic workers are workers, not family members, and are more
vulnerable to labour exploitation than most other groups of workers. Much
of the domestic labour workforce is composed of migrants who are often
preferred by the employers to the country’s nationals, particularly if they
are live-in domestic workers. Immigration status, as will be explained
below, makes the domestic worker vulnerable to abuse. Live-in domestic
workers, who are most of the times migrants, are even more susceptible to
ill-treatment. Domestic work is hard to regulate. It is invisible because it is
performed away from the public eye, in the privacy of the employer’s
household. The location of domestic labour is an additional factor of
vulnerability, as it makes the workers more prone to abuse by the employ-
ers as they are hidden from the authorities and the public.
Domestic labour also has a stigma attached to it, because it is the
poorest and neediest who are occupied in it, and due to the tasks required
from the workers, which are gendered and undervalued (Nussbaum 1999,
p. 282). Domestic work is precarious for social (gender, race, migration
and social class), psychological (intimacy and stigma), and also economic
reasons (low pay).
Sadly, examples of abuse of domestic workers are widespread, as has
been shown in research conducted under the auspices of the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) and other international organizations that linked
the working conditions of domestic workers to situations of slavery, and
called for regulation of the sector.6 There is also important academic litera-
ture that documents and analyses the problems associated with the working
and living conditions of domestic workers (Anderson 2000, Bales 2000, ch.
1). Some numbers can illustrate the problem. A recent report by Kalayaan,
a non-governmental organization (NGO) working on migrant domestic
workers in the UK, said that in 2010, 60% of those who registered with it
were not allowed out unaccompanied, 65% had their passport withheld,
54% suffered psychological abuse, 18% suffered physical abuse or assault,
3% were sexually abused, 26% did not receive adequate meals, and 49%
did not have their own room. Their working conditions were exploitative:
67% worked seven days a week without time off, 58% had to be available
‘on call’ 24 hours a day, 48% worked at least 16 hours a day, and 56%
received a weekly salary of £50 or less (Lalani 2011, p. 10).
Domestic workers are more vulnerable to abuse than other categories of
workers for the reasons described above. Particularly when they are live-in,
they are more susceptible to harm because they are hidden from the authori-
ties. They are also less likely to report the harm suffered because they are
almost always migrant and live in fear of deportation. Yet domestic work is
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vital in today’s world, when female family members participate in the labour
market outside home. There is, therefore, a pressing need for regulation.
Is the regulation of the domestic labour sector satisfactory? As the
following section shows, the answer to this question is negative. Domestic
workers are excluded from many labour rights in national law, and are there-
fore treated as marginal citizens. Their exclusion is not justiﬁed and is often
due to practicalities. This situation is coupled by very restrictive immigra-
tion rules. When they are immigrants, and hence do not have citizenship as
formal legal status, domestic workers are faced with immigration legislation
that facilitates their exploitation even further. The law pushes citizens to the
margins, depriving them of the power to change their position.
How does the law treat domestic workers as marginal citizens?
Working conditions and union representation
A few examples from national legislation that deprives domestic workers
of labour rights that other workers possess help illustrate the problem of
marginal citizenship. In many jurisdictions labour laws on working
conditions and union representation differentiate the treatment of domestic
workers from other workers (e.g. European Trade Union Confederation
2005, Ramirez-Machado 2003). In the UK, for instance, they are exempted
from legislation on working time, minimum wage, and health and safety.
Regulation 19 of the Working Time Regulations excludes domestic workers
in private homes from the majority of Regulations 4–8 on maximum
weekly working time, maximum working time for young workers, length
of night work, night work by young workers, and restrictions on the
patterns of work that can be set by employers when there is risk to the
health and safety of a worker. These examples are by no means
exceptional. Working-time exclusions are found in almost half of the
countries surveyed in a report of the ILO (2010, p. 49), while at the same
time the majority of the countries examined (83%) do not impose a limit
on night work of domestic workers (p. 50).
On minimum wage, the UK Minimum Wage Regulations 1999 exempt
family members and those living within the family household who are not
family, but work in the household or for the family business, from the
scope of protection. Canada, Finland, Japan and Switzerland offer further
examples of such exclusion from minimum wage legislation (ILO 2010,
p. 40). Further exclusions from the scope of legislation can be observed
when it comes to trade union representation. Even though collective
organization can have crucial effects for workers who are migrant and work
in a household, such as a feeling of membership and inclusion in society,7
various countries like Ethiopia and Jordan exclude them from protection
(D’Souza 2010, p. 49).
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Another area of law that treats domestic workers differently to other
workers is the exemption from, or special regulation of, monitoring of
working conditions through labour inspections. Section 51 of the UK
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, which regulates working conditions,
inspection and sanctions, excludes domestic workers from its scope
altogether. In France, inspectors can monitor the working conditions of
domestic workers, but only after a court order. In other jurisdictions, the
law sets special conditions for inspectors to be able to visit the household,
such as a request by one of the parties (Ramirez-Machado 2003, p. 63).
Domestic workers, as it emerges, irrespective of their status as nationals
or foreigners, are excluded from labour rights – both individual and collec-
tive – and pushed to the margins of the labour market. Having a right to
work, which is a central element of citizenship, but no labour rights that
other workers enjoy, domestic workers are not treated equally to them’.8
This unequal treatment is not justiﬁed on grounds of principle, but is
mainly due to the practical difﬁculties that the regulation of this sector
raises. Yet immigration legislation is the key reason why domestic workers
are described in this article as marginal citizens.
Immigration status
Immigration legislation on domestic worker visas leads to the worst forms
of marginalization, for it deprives domestic workers of the ability to change
their position without a very considerable cost: that of deportation. In the
UK, immigration rules (sections 159A-159H) allowed until recently domes-
tic workers to change employers (but not their work sector). Following
reforms, today when migrant domestic workers arrive lawfully in the coun-
try accompanying a particular employer, their visa status ties them to this
employer. Their residency status is lawful for as long as the employer with
whom they entered employs them. Immigration law gives the employer
unprecedented power to control the domestic workers, who know that they
will be deported if they lose their job (Anderson 2010b, p. 310). Similar
programmes exist in other jurisdictions, like Canada (Carens 2008a,
p. 433).
Migrant domestic workers are in a vulnerable position. Irregular
migrants, namely workers who entered a country unlawfully or overstayed
their visa or work permit, are the most precarious of all. Immigration law
permits their deportation, since their status in the country is unlawful. Due
to the fear of deportation, domestic workers often wish to remain invisible
to the authorities, and their desire to remain invisible makes them vulnera-
ble to abuse. But the anxiety of deportation is not the only implication of
the irregular status of a migrant worker.
What is particularly troubling for the purposes of this article is that the
irregular status of workers has implications for employment rights too, with
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rules of employment law leading to further marginalization. In the UK, for
example, the employment contract of an unlawful resident is considered to
be illegal. Workers whose contract is illegal have very limited rights. The
problem was illustrated in a case of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT),
where a migrant domestic worker, Ms Hounga, who overstayed her tourist
visa and kept on working as a domestic worker, was seriously ill-treated and
eventually dismissed by her employer (Allen (Nee Aboyade-Cole) v Hounga,
[2011] UKEAT 0326_10_3103). Because of her irregular status in the UK,
the tribunal ruled that the employment contract was illegal, so her claims for
unfair dismissal, breach of contract, unpaid wages and holiday pay could not
be enforced. The EAT said that ‘the courts exist to enforce the law, not to
enforce illegality’ (para. 37). On its view, Ms Hounga never had the right to
work, so she could not claim loss of earnings because of her discriminatory
dismissal. Only her discrimination claim was allowed, as it did not depend
on a valid contract of employment. Yet the Court of Appeal was not willing
to accept that the discrimination claim should be allowed for the reason that
she was fully aware of the illegality (Hounga v Allen [2012] EWCA Civ
609). The approach of courts in decisions such as Hounga, which uphold an
unlimited power of the employer for exploitation of irregular migrant work-
ers, is problematic (Carens 2008b, p. 172) and reinforces the employer’s
power of domination.
Citizenship requires recognition and protection of civil and political,
and social and labour rights. Domestic workers, though, both when they
have formal citizenship or a work permit, and – even more so – when they
are unlawfully employed, suffer from exclusions or special treatment in
legislation, which in this way treats them not as full members of society or
the labour market, but as workers and citizens at the margins.
The employment relationship is commonly described as one of submis-
sion and subordination (Davies and Freedland 1983, p. 18), and one of the
justiﬁcations of labour law is exactly to address this situation. In the case
of domestic workers, the problem is that legislation reinforces (rather than
addressing) the relation of submission and subordination. In the examples
presented above, the states’ ability to deport and the employers’ ability to
control workers who fear deportation highlight the unique power of the
employer to dominate the worker, for it is the law itself, through immigra-
tion and other rules, that reinforces the workers’ existing precariousness
(Anderson et al. 2011).
Human rights for marginal citizens
Even though labour rights are essential for citizenship, labour and immigra-
tion law in many legal orders have severe shortcomings, treating certain
categories of workers as marginal citizens. International human rights law,
though, counteracts the marginal legal status of groups of workers that lack
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certain legal rights. Exploring the justiﬁcation of workers’ rights, Guy
Mundlak noted that:
the fundamental difference is that citizenship rights are aimed at establishing
the relationship between individuals and groups and the community, most
notably the nation-state. Human rights are rooted in a perception of humanity
that extends beyond the nation-state. They do not describe obligations and
rights of members in the community, but identify the rights and obligations
of all humankind. (Mundlak 2007, p. 540)
Universality is indeed a central feature of human rights, which are
attached to everyone simply by virtue of being human, regardless of
whether they are citizens or not (Tasioulas 2012, p. 17). If we view social
and labour rights as human rights (Mantouvalou 2012b), it is hard to recog-
nize different entitlements to different human beings (Jones 1994, p. 167).
International human rights law recognizes that certain labour rights are
fundamental human rights. In Europe, for instance, the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (1950) protects civil and political rights, while the
European Social Charter (1961) incorporates economic and social rights.
Most labour rights are classiﬁed as social rights, but some of them are
classiﬁed as civil and political rights in these treaties. The supervisory
mechanisms of human rights treaties in Europe and elsewhere have
frequently ruled that everyone must enjoy human rights, which cannot be
made conditional on citizenship.9 The exclusion of undocumented migrants
from labour rights protection was addressed at length in a landmark advi-
sory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2003) that
emphasized that human rights, including labour rights, are based on human
dignity and not on the status of citizenship or lawful residence.
Developments in international human rights law in recent years have
helped to address the marginalization of domestic workers more particu-
larly. Two examples will be used to support this: ﬁrst, a decision of the
European Court of Human Rights, and second, a treaty of the ILO.10
Siliadin
In 2005 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the judicial organ
of the Council of Europe that monitors compliance with the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for its 47 member states, decided
the case Siliadin v France (App. No. 73,316/01, Judgment of 26 July
2005).11 The facts of the case illustrate the cruelty of the social problem.
The applicant was a Togolese national who was brought to France to work
and be educated, but was instead kept at home as a domestic worker. She
had to clean the house and the employer’s ofﬁce; look after three children;
she slept on the ﬂoor in their room; rarely had a day off; and was almost
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 375
never paid. When she escaped from her employers, she was faced with the
fact that French law did not criminalize this behaviour. She was only
awarded some compensation in respect of arrears of salary, holiday leave
and notice period. Having exhausted domestic remedies, she took her case
to the ECtHR in Strasbourg. She claimed that lack of criminal legislation
dealing with the abuse that she suffered constituted a violation of article 4
of the ECHR, which states, insofar as relevant: ‘1. No one shall be held in
slavery or servitude. 2. No one shall be required to perform forced or com-
pulsory labour.’ In dealing with this situation, the court took two steps.
First, it stated that this situation is not ‘slavery’. It considered that a right
of legal ownership is a constitutive element of slavery, and made reference
to the 1926 Slavery Convention of the United Nations for support, which
states that ‘slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’. The
employers of Siliadin did not have a legal right of ownership over her, so
this aspect of article 4 was not at stake in the present case.
Even though the court ruled that Siliadin was not a slave, it classiﬁed
her situation as ‘servitude’, which is still in the scope of article 4. On servi-
tude, it said that:
what is prohibited is a ‘particularly serious form of denial of freedom’. […]
It includes, ‘in addition to the obligation to perform certain services for oth-
ers […] the obligation for the serf’ to live on another person’s property and
the impossibility of altering his condition. (para. 123)
Being a minor at the time, the applicant migrant domestic worker had
to work almost 15 hours a day, seven days per week. She had not chosen
to work for her employers, had no resources, was isolated, had no money
to move elsewhere, and ‘was entirely at [the employers’] mercy, since her
papers had been conﬁscated and she had been promised that her immigra-
tion status would be regularised, which had never occurred’ (para. 126).
She was almost never free to leave the house, nor did she have any free
time. Even though she had been promised that she would be sent to school,
this never happened, so she had no hope that her life would improve.
Second, the court found that article 4 imposes positive obligations on state
authorities. It not only requires that the state refrains from keeping individ-
uals in exploitative labour conditions, but also imposes a state duty to
criminalize private conduct that is classiﬁed as falling in the scope of
article 4. Lack of criminal legislation penalizing grave labour exploitation
by private employers, in other words, is incompatible with the ECHR.
Despite the fact that the Siliadin judgment did not rule that the appli-
cant was a slave, it found that her condition had elements akin to slavery.
Shklar (1995, p. 16) said with reference to American citizenship that its
value ‘was derived primarily from its denial to slaves, to some white men,
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and to all women’. European human rights law endorsed this approach.
The situation of a migrant domestic worker was ruled to be akin to slavery
– a total denial of citizenship, which the court ruled to be incompatible
with international human rights law. It is important to emphasize that the
Siliadin judgment attracted the attention of national and international
organizations, and raised awareness on the situation of domestic workers
who are employed in unacceptable conditions, and are isolated. Siliadin
triggered debates and legislative reform in the UK, which enacted section
71 of the Coroners and Justice Act that criminalizes slavery, servitude,
forced and compulsory labour in a development that was celebrated in aca-
demic literature and NGO campaigns for demonstrating the transformative
power of human rights law (Mantouvalou 2010).
ILO Convention on Domestic Workers
More recently, the ILO adopted a landmark Convention and Recommenda-
tion, which emphasized the importance of the protection of the human
rights of domestic workers. On the 100th session of the International
Labour Conference, in June 2011, the ILO adopted Convention No. 189
and supplementing Recommendation No. 201 regulating the terms and con-
ditions of work for domestic workers.12 In regulating the work of domestic
workers, the Convention adopts a human rights approach. Already from its
Preamble it makes reference to numerous international human rights instru-
ments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR). Article 3(1) states that member states ‘shall take mea-
sures to ensure the effective promotion and protection of the human rights
of all domestic workers, as set out in this Convention’, and Article 3(2)
highlights the importance of freedom of association, the elimination of
forced labour, the abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimi-
nation. It also places emphasis on private life rights of domestic workers
(article 6) and the potential for abuse in the privacy of the employers’
household (article 5). These provisions reﬂect the special challenges of the
public–private divide that characterize the domestic labour relation. The
Convention expresses desirability for state intervention in a location that is
at the time the domestic worker’s workplace, but also the employers’ and
the workers’ home (when they are live-in domestic workers).
The Domestic Workers’ Convention includes both civil rights, such as
access to justice and privacy, and social and labour rights, such as working
time and minimum wage, taking an integrated approach towards human
rights law, which is in line with the ideal of citizenship that Marshall
developed where all groups of rights are essential for membership. This
integrated approach breaks down traditional divisions between civil and
social rights, and this is important because international human rights law
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created in the past an artiﬁcial dichotomy between the two categories of
entitlements (Mantouvalou 2013). This integrated approach characterizes the
work of the ILO more generally and has also been described as a ‘holistic
approach’ (Leary 1996, p. 40). It is one of its important contributions, for it
rests on the recognition that human rights are not easily separable, either
practically or as a matter of principle. There is no hierarchy between them.
The right to privacy is no more important than the right to decent working
conditions, and there may in fact be an overlap between the two: there can
be no decent working conditions for a worker who does not enjoy a certain
degree of privacy in the workplace. There is also no privacy for a live-in
domestic worker whose working conditions are appalling and who is not
allowed to have private time or private space. The links between all rights
are complex, and the approach of the ILO recognizes that.
Most signiﬁcantly, the Convention ‘applies to all domestic workers’
(article 2), irrespective of immigration status, reﬂecting the universalist nat-
ure of human rights standards. A person’s immigration status, sex or social
status makes her no less of a right-holder. It should be explained that uni-
versality is a normative notion: it does not mean that everyone is, in fact,
protected. Both governments and courts sometimes exclude categories of
people from human rights protection. Universality means that everyone
should be protected.
The ILO Convention itself leaves a gap, though, which is hard to
reconcile with its human rights approach and its basic purpose, namely the
inclusion of all domestic workers in its protective framework. It provides
for certain exclusions (article 2(2)). These may apply to ‘limited categories
of workers in respect of which special problems of a substantial nature
arise’. It is not clear why the Convention contains this provision. It can
fairly be assumed that one reason that led to the adoption of Convention
189 was the fact that many jurisdictions treat domestic workers as marginal
citizens. That this Convention, which has been speciﬁcally drafted to pro-
tect domestic workers, allows the exclusion of some of them from its scope
is therefore troubling. The provision appears to be contrary to the docu-
ment’s purpose and incompatible with the universalist nature of human
rights, including labour rights.
The adoption of a human rights approach by the ILO has not been
uncontroversial because often in labour law circles there is scepticism as to
the role of human rights in the protection of workers’ interests (Kolben
2010, Collins 2011). The human rights provisions of the ILO Domestic
Workers Convention, however, can only be welcomed. This is because they
recognize the universality, and the moral weight and urgency of domestic
workers’ claims that become, thanks to the ILO, binding legal obligations.
It is to be hoped that the universalist nature of human rights as normative
standards will not permit the exclusion of domestic workers in the future
interpretation and application of the Convention.
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Domestic workers are left at the margins of citizenship very often, as
shown above, because national law leaves them outside the scope of labour
legislation, and makes them even more prone to abuse through very restric-
tive immigration legislation. International human rights, on the other hand,
incorporate universal normative standards that counteract the problem of mar-
ginalization of certain categories of workers. International human rights and
international labour law have in recent years endorsed the principle of univer-
sality and rejected citizenship as formal status as a condition for the enjoy-
ment of rights. Human rights law shows that it is impermissible to deprive
workers of their basic labour rights and to treat them as marginal citizens.
Conclusion
There is much to be gained by the analysis of citizenship, when viewed as
a normative concept, as to the rights that it entails. Its communitarian ele-
ments, and the weight that it places on membership to society, are an
important addition to more traditional liberal human rights theories that
mainly focus on the individual. Importantly, citizenship requires respect for
labour rights, as much as it requires respect for other human rights. The
exclusion of certain categories of workers, such as domestic workers, from
these rights is wrong. This article presented domestic workers as marginal
citizens because they work, but are excluded from, several labour rights in
national legal orders. If they are migrants, and particularly if they have an
irregular status, they are likely to be left outside the scope of rights of citi-
zenship altogether. International human rights law counteracts the marginal
legal status of these groups of workers. By being attached to everyone
simply by virtue of being human, irrespective of nationality, human rights
can complement citizenship rights when both are viewed as normative
standards.13 The example of domestic work as it has been approached in
international human rights law in recent years shows that certain rights of
workers are universal. Their enjoyment cannot depend on citizenship as
legal status or on regular residency. The enjoyment of labour rights as
human rights depends, and should only depend, on the status of someone
as a human being who is also a worker.
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Notes
1. For a theoretical account of social rights as human rights, see Nickel (2009,
ch. 9). For a legal debate, see Gearty and Mantouvalou (2011); on citizenship
as a possible justiﬁcation of social rights, see particularly p. 105.
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2. For an introductory account of citizenship theory, see Bellamy (2008). For an
overview of key literature, see Bellamy and Palumbo (2010) (see also Bosniak
2002).
3. See also the discussion in Schultz (2000, p. 1928).
4. See the discussion in Bosniak (2006).
5. This section draws on Albin and Mantouvalou (2012).
6. For some early studies and responses by international organizations, see
Blackett (1998), ILO Director General Report (2001, p. 29), ILO Director
General Report (2005, p. 50), and Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly
(2004). Further studies will be discussed below.
7. See the case study presented in Anderson (2010a).
8. For further examples of exclusions, see Mantouvalou (2012a).
9. See, for instance, International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH)
v France, Complaint No. 14/2003, 8 September 2004.
10. For further examples, see Mantouvalou (2012a).
11. For analysis, see Mantouvalou (2006).
12. For further analysis, see Albin and Mantouvalou (2012).
13. For further discussion on the complementary role of social rights as human
rights and citizenship rights, see Jones (1994, p. 165).
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